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Class Action's Last Hope: The
Argument for Federal Statutory
Rights Preemption of the Federal
Arbitration Act
In re American Express Merchants'Litigation'
I. INTRODUCTION
Interpretation of arbitration agreements and class action waivers has been a
point of confusion among the United States Circuit CourtS2 following the U.S.
Supreme Court's class action decisions in 2010.3 These decisions dealt with con-
tractual silence as to class arbitration" and state laws voiding arbitration agree-
ments,5 but the issue of federal statutory rights as they relate to arbitrable class
actions is still unresolved by the Supreme Court.6 The Supreme Court has yet to
decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts other federal statutes,
such as federal antitrust statutes and civil rights statutes.7 The "Effective Vindica-
tion Doctrine," recently coined by one scholar,' is a doctrine under which the
Supreme Court has articulated that essential federal statutes are not preempted by
the FAA.9
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to resolve the question of whether
federal statutory rights may preempt the FAA with the Court's grant of certiorari
in the case of In re American Express Merchants'Litigation.0 While other appel-
late courts have chosen not to directly address the questions created by the Effec-
1. 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
2. Compare In re Am Express Merch. Litigation, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (Permitting class
action or arbitration because antitrust action would be so expensive that no plaintiff would seek to
vindicate their federal statutory rights) with Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Holding under the FAA it is immaterial whether customers have a sufficient incentive to vindicate
their state rights).
3. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
6. Ellen Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effective Vindication Doctrine at the Anti-
trust/arbitration Crossroads, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 67 ("Concepcion appears for now at least
to have largely (if not completely) foreclosed arguments that public policy interests under state law in
allowing access to class action procedures are a sufficient basis to avoid what would otherwise be an
enforceable arbitration agreement to which the FAA applies.").
7. Id.
8. Id. at 70 (stating Ellen Meriwether is a litigation partner at Cafferty Faucher LP and concentrates
her practice in antitrust class action litigation. She is an associate editor of ANTITRUST).
9. Id. at 67.
10. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
1
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tive Vindication Doctrine," American Express squarely presents the issue for
review. 12 This note will examine the history behind several recent federal deci-
sions on class arbitration13 as well as federal antitrust laws and how antitrust laws
should be enforced in the shadow of the FAA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Defendant, American Express, is the leading issuer of charge cards to
consumers and businesses. 4 A charge card submits the balance to the cardholder
at the end of the billing cycle and requires full payment of the amount outstand-
ing.' 5 In contrast, a credit card allows the cardholder to pay only a portion of the
amount outstanding at the close of the billing cycle and subjects the remaining
amount outstanding to interest charges.' 6 The charge card is a method of payment,
whereas the credit card is a way for consumers to finance their transaction.' 7 Be-
cause the average charge card user is more affluent then the average credit card
user, American Express is able to charge a high merchant discount fee' 9 on all
charge card purchases. 20
In American Express, plaintiffs allege American Express is violating the anti-
trust protections of the Clayton Act by tying their char e card merchant discount
fees and agreements to their growing credit card brand.2 Plaintiffs argue this tying
action makes American Express credit cards far more costly to merchants than
other credit card companies who charge a more competitive merchant discount
rate.22
Plaintiffs are the National Supermarkets Association, Inc. (NSA), 23 as well as
California and New York corporations that operate businesses and have contracted
11. Meriwether, supra note 6, at 70 (Stating "Other courts of appeals have not yet squarely ad-
dressed whether the effective vindication doctrine continues to apply to federal claims following Con-
ception. In Kilgore v. Key Bank National Association, the Ninth Circuit implied in dictum that the
effective vindication doctrine continues to apply to federal claims following Conception, but the court
had no occasion to directly address the issue because the case involved only state law claims and state
public policy concerns. . . . In Coneff v. AT&T, the Ninth Circuit considered the exact same arbitration
clause at issue in Conception. Although one federal claim (among many state law claims) was at issue
and the plaintiff expressly raised the effective vindication doctrine, the court decided the case on
preemption grounds, holding that state public policy concerns, however worthwhile, could not, con-
sistent with Conception, undermine the FAA.").
12. Id. at 69.
13. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); In re Am. Express Merch. Litigation,
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
14. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 207.




19. A merchant discount fee is the "rate charged to a merchant by a bank for providing debit and
credit card services." Merchant Discount Rate Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/merchant-discount-rate.asp (last visited Nov. I1, 2013).
20. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 208.
2 1. Id.
22. Id
23. Id. at 207. National Supermarkets Association, Inc. is a "voluntary membership-based trade
association that represents the interests of independently owned supermarkets." Id..
[Vol. 2013430
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with American Express. 24 Plaintiffs allege American Express has used an "Honor
All Cards" provision contained in the Card Acceptance Agreement for their popu-
lar charge cards to compel merchants to not only accept American Express credit
and debit cards, but also to apply the agreed upon charge card fees to American
Express credit and debit card transactions.25 The Honor All Cards provision of the
agreement provides that acceptance of American Express Cards "shall mean any
card or other account access device issued by American Express... bearing the
American Express name or trademark, service mark or logo." 26 American Ex-
press's Card Acceptance Agreement is a standard form contract that may be ter-
minated at any time by any party by sending written notice.27 The Agreement also
contains a mandatory arbitration clause, and class arbitration waiver. 28
Plaintiffs bring a class action with a class consisting of all merchants that
have accepted American Express charge cards and have therefore effectively
agree to accept credit and debit cards that bare the American Express Logo.29
Plaintiffs assert that by compelling merchants to apply the Honor All Cards provi-
sion, merchants are faced with the choice of paying supracompetitive merchant
discount fees on American Express credit and debit cards, or losing a significant
portion of sales they receive from traditional charge card users, 30 who are consid-
ered highly desirable to merchants due to their affluence and large volume of pur-
chases. Procedurally, this case represents the third time the Second Circuit had
reviewed the American Express case.32
Plaintiffs in American Express filed their original class action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking average dam-
ages of $5,000 per plaintiff.33 American Express moved to compel enforcement of
the arbitration agreement pursuant to their Card Acceptance Agreement. American
Express' motion to compel arbitration was granted by the District Court leading
24. Id.
25. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 208.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. ("IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM,
NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT
OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM.... FURTHER, YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. THE
ARBITRATOR'S DECISION WILL BE FINAL AND BINDING. NOTE THAT OTHER RIGHTS
THAT YOU WOULD HAVE IF YOU WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN
ARBITRATION. There shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action
basis or on any basis involving Claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the
general public, other establishments which accept the Card (Service Establishments), or other persons
or entities similarly situated. Furthermore, Claims brought by or against a Service Establishment may
not be joined or consolidated in the arbitration with Claims brought by or against any other Service
Establishment(s), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by all parties").
29. Id. at 207.
30. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 208.
31. Id. at207.
32. In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig. (Amex 1), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Am. Express
Merchants' Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Am. Express Merch. Litigation (Amex
Ill), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
33. Amex 1, 554 F.3d at 308. (Plaintiffs argue that each individual plaintiff would have to incur
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plaintiffs to appeal the decision due to the prohibitive costs of arbitrating an anti-
trust dispute bilaterally. 34 Plaintiffs' appeal was heard before the Second Circuit in
a case now referred to as American Express I.35
In American Express 1,36 the Second Circuit found that the Southern District
of New York erred in upholding the class arbitration waiver because the District
Court did not view the case in light of the Clayton Act's3 7 statutory antitrust pro-
tections against tying products together to gain an unfair competitive advantage.3 8
Plaintiffs argued that if they were not allowed to proceed as a class, the cost of
proceeding bilaterally would be prohibitive. 39 The Second Circuit agreed with
Plaintiffs' argument and found the arbitration agreement led to a significant risk
that enforcement of the class waiver would effectively deprive plaintiffs of their
rights to vindication under federal antitrust statutes. 40 American Express appealed
the Second Circuit's decision, and the Supreme Court granted American Express's
petition for certiorari. 41 However, the Supreme Court remanded for consideration
in light of the then recently decided Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp.42 decision.43 The remanded case is now referred to as American Express II.
In American Express II, the Second Circuit distinguished American Express II
from Stolt-Nielsen, also an antitrust class dispute.44 In American Express, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that enforcement of the class waiver would practically preclude
antitrust claims due to the cost of bringing even a small antitrust claim. 45 The
Supreme Court decision in Stolt-Nielsen on the other hand, was decided on
grounds that the Supreme Court found the panel of arbitrators to have exceeded its
power by creating class arbitration where none was contracted for.46 The Second
Circuit interpreted Stolt-Nielsen a standing for the principle that "parties cannot be
forced to arbitrate disputes in class action arbitration unless the parties agree to
class action arbitration."4 7
The Second Circuit found its analysis in American Express I to be unaffected
by Stolt-Nielsen.48 The Second Circuit placed a hold on American Express II in
34. In reAm. Express Merchs., 2006 WL 662341, at *1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 138, ("The Clayton Act, as an antitrust
law, is intended for the protection of competition, not competitors.").
38. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 210.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401, 176 L. Ed. 2d 920 (2010)
42. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
43. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 212, 218. The Second Circuit relied on expert witness affidavits which
asserted that "even a relatively small economic antitrust study will cost at least several hundred thou-
sand dollars, while a larger study can easily exceed $1 million." The Second Circuit, after reviewing
expert witness' information, found "the only economically feasible means for enforcing [Plaintiffs]
statutory rights is via a class action." Evidence presented by Plaintiffs showed that the highest ex-
pected damage for any individual plaintiff was "$38,549 when trebled" and it "would not be worth-
while for an individual plaintiff... to pursue individual arbitration or litigation." Id
44. Id.
45. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 212 (citing Amex II, 634 F.3d 197-198).
46. Id. at 211 (citing Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 676).
47. Id. at 213.
48. Id. at 212.
[Vol. 2013432
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order for American Express to file another writ of certiorari.49 While on hold, the
Supreme Court issued a new class action arbitration decision, AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 50 leading the Second Circuit to revisit American Express in a case
now referred to as American Express IJ.51
In American Express III, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it would be
tempting to read Stolt-Nielson and Concepcion as rendering class waivers per se
enforceable. 52 The Court distinguished American Express III from Concepcion
because the Concepcion decision offered a way to analyze whether a state contract
law is preempted by the FAA while in American Express I and II, the Second
Circuit's holding rested on a vindication of federal statutory rights analysis.53 The
Court found its analysis to be unaltered by the Supreme Court decisions and again
remanded to the Southern District of New York.54 American Express filed a writ
certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court on November 9, 2012.'-
The Second Circuit did not order class arbitration in any of the American Ex-
press cases, finding such an order to be barred by the Stolt-Nielsen decision.56
The Court stated that Stolt-Nielsen precluded any court from compelling the par-
ties to submit to class arbitration when the parties have not agreed to class arbitra-
tion.57 Rather, the Court permitted American Express the option of class arbitra-
tion and class action by finding the class waiver to be unenforceable.58
The Second Circuit held that class waivers should not be enforced when do-
ing so would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory right to
bring certain lawsuits. Having again granted certiorari, the Supreme Court now
has the opportunity to review the Second Circuit's reasoning in American Express
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. When a Contract is Silent on Class Arbitration
The Supreme Court has stated the FAA was enacted with the express purpose
of making written agreements for arbitration of contract disputes valid and en-
forceable. Due to the desire to make arbitration agreements enforceable, the
issue of silence in arbitration clauses has often left courts in a difficult situation.
The issue remained unresolved until the Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen.62
In Stolt-Nielsen, a class of shipping company plaintiffs sued Stolt-Nielsen, an
49. Id. at 204.
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
51. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 204, 206.
52. Id. at 212.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
56. Id. at 219 (citing Amex I, 554 F. 3d at 321; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010).
60. Meriwether, supra note 6, at 68.
61. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 681-682.
62. Id. at 1758.
No. 2] 433
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international shipping company, alleging an antitrust violation of conspiring to
restrain competition in the global tanker transportation industry.63 An arbitration
panel ruled that claimants were entitled to class arbitration, a decision the Su-
preme Court ultimately struck down.6 4
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that an arbitrator may not create
class arbitration absent consent to class arbitration. 65 The Stolt-Nielsen claimants
had argued for a reading of a previous decision, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,66
as creating a test requiring arbitrators to look to the language of the parties'
agreement, and then ascertain the parties' intention regarding class arbitration. 67
The Court in Stolt-Nielsen rejected this reading of Green Tree, remarking that
Green Tree did not establish a rule for deciding whether class arbitration is per-
mitted but left that question unanswered.68 Instead the Stolt-Nielsen Court stated
that while "interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state
law," certain rules are imposed by the FAA, including that "arbitration is a matter
of consent, not coercion." 69 The Court held that due to the consensual nature of
arbitration agreements, generally parties are free to structure their arbitration
agreements in any way they see fit. 70
In Stolt-Nielsen, an arbitration panel found an agreement to class arbitration
because the parties failed to expressly preclude class arbitration.71 However, the
Supreme Court found the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration
to be too material to allow such a finding by an arbitrator. 72 Specifically, the Su-
preme Court distinguished class arbitration from bilateral arbitration with respect
to differences in privacy, cost, efficiency, speed and availability of arbitrators with
the skill and knowledge needed to resolve class disputes. 73
The Supreme Court found that under FAA principles, 74 an arbitrator may not
compel class arbitration without a contractual basis for concluding that the parties
agreed to permit class arbitration.75 Agreeing to arbitrate is not a sufficient basis




66. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
67. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 1772.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1773.
70. Id. at 1774.
71. Id. at 1775.
72. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 1775.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1763. The court looked at the following FAA provisions: 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1947) (providing
"a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.") and 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (1947) (providing a "party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States
District Court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.").
75. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 1775.
[Vol. 2013434
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arbitration and bilateral arbitration are fundamentally different.7 6 Therefore, the
Court found the arbitration panel exceeded its power by compelling class arbitra-
tion where the parties had not agreed to any class arbitration provision.7 7
Ultimately, Stolt-Nielsen delivered a new rule for interpreting silence on class
arbitration by framing the question as being "whether the parties agreed to author-
ize class arbitration."78 However, the Stolt-Nielsen ruling did not resolve the po-
tential issue of a state or federal policy in conflict with the FAA.
B. Explicit Waiver of Class Arbitration and State Public Policy
Whether state laws can render class action waivers in arbitration agreements
void came under review by the United States Supreme Court in the 2011 decision,
AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion.7 9 The Concepcions brought a class action
against AT&T because AT&T charged $30.22 in sales tax for cell phones that had
been advertised as free.80
AT&T's arbitration clauses expressly denied the ability of plaintiffs to bring
class arbitration suits.8' The Concepcions attempted to attack the clause as invalid
under California public policy and the FAA"s Savings Clause.8 2 The FAA's
Savings Clause states that arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable except
upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract.8 ' The Cali-
fornia public policy involved in Concepcion was created by the California Su-
preme Court's opinion in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.84
Discover Bank allowed California consumers to invalidate arbitration agree-
ments under the FAA's Savings Clause when the arbitration provision was found
in a contract of adhesion, the parties predictably request small damages, and it is
"alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money."85 The Concepcions attempted to use Discover Bank8 6 with the FAA's
Savings Clause to void their arbitration agreement with AT&T, but the Supreme
Court held that a federal statute's savings clause cannot be construed as allowing a
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1776.
78. Id.
79. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
80. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009).
81. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, (Arbitration agreement stated claims must be brought in "indi-
vidual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceed-
ing").
82. Id. at 1743.
83. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1947).
84. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding class arbitration waivers
"found in consumer contracts of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money," the class arbitration waive is void due to unconscionability).
85. Id.
86. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100.
87. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
No. 2] 435
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state right to exist when it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the federal
statute.88
The Supreme Court found that the FAA's primary purpose is to ensure that
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. 89 Further, arbitration
is a matter of contract.90 Therefore arbitration waivers are generally enforced
according to their terms.9 1 Similar to the opinion in Stolt-Nielsen, the Concepcion
Court found bilateral arbitration to be fundamentally different from class arbitra-
tion.92 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court also found class arbitration to present
increased risks to defendants that errors will not be corrected due to the lack of
multilayered review, which a defendant would have in our court systems. 93 The
Supreme Court found Discover Bank, to the extent it led to the creation of class
arbitration, to be in conflict with arbitration's fundamental characteristic of being
consensual because an agreement to arbitration is fundamentally different from
agreement to class arbitration. 94
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Concepcion ruled that state law is preempt-
ed by the FAA whenever it stands at odds with the execution of the objectives of
Congress.9 5 The main objective of the FAA, as stated by the Supreme Court, is to
ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms;
therefore, state law may not preempt an arbitration agreement.96 However, the
Concepcion decision did not address how a court should approach federal statutes,
like federal antitrust statutes, that are in conflict with the FAA.
C. Antitrust Acts
The first federal legislation to attempt to regulate antitrust actions was the
Sherman Act, passed in I890.97 Some scholars believe the Sherman Act was
brought about due to a desire to maximize efficiency9 8 while others believe that
Congress sought to protect consumers, 99 or to protect smaller competitors from
being run out of the market. 00 While the exact reasons behind the passage of the
Sherman Act are unclear today, it is clear that the Sherman Act was designed to
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1745 (citing Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)).
91. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
92. Id. at 1750.
93. Id. at 1752.
94. Id. at 1751.
95. Id. at 1753.
96. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
97. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1980).
98. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (stating that goals of legislation were consumer
welfare and efficiency).
99. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of
society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition.
John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers,
Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191 (2008) (stating that the ultimate goal of anti-
trust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives
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"safeguard consumers by protecting the competitive process." 0 The Act reflects
a judgment by Congress that competition will produce lower prices as well as
higher quality goods and services, both of which are good for the American con-
sumers.102
The Sherman Act creates two federal violations that reflect a legislative
judgment that anticompetitive acts are against federal public policy. Section one
of the Sherman Act makes it a felony for competitors to conspire to restrain trade
or commerce. 03 Section two of the Sherman act makes it a felony to monopolize,
attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize in a way that restrains trade.'
While the Sherman Act was the first act by Congress espousing a policy that anti-
competitive acts are contrary to public welfare, the Clayton Act 05 was later
passed to strengthen and enforce this policy.
Following the 1912 presidential election, President Woodrow Wilson re-
sponded to public opinion that the Sherman act was too lenient on corporations by
requesting that Congress pass legislation to supplement and strengthen the Sher-
man Act.' As a result, Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914.107 The Clay-
ton Act established more provisions to help prohibit anticompetitive acts. Among
the added protections were laws against price discrimination,' 08 exclusive deal-
ing,' 09 labor union organizations,o"0 and mergers."' Additionally, the Clayton Act
permitted private lawsuits for antitrust violations where previously only the feder-
al government could pursue antitrust acts.112 Two important provisions of the
Clayton Act are the provision that allows private parties to bring antitrust suits and
the provision that grants treble damages to injured private parties.
When private parties succeed on their antitrust claims, they are awarded treble
damages.1 4 Treble damages are necessary for "optimal deterrence of unlawful
101. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 2004).
102. Nat'I Soc 'y of Prof' Eng rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
103. The Sherman Act § 1.
104. Id. at § 2.
105. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914).
106. The Clayton Act, ANTITRUSTLAWS.ORG, http://www.antitrustlaws.org/Clayton-Act.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2013).
107. Id.
108. Id. (stating that "the Clayton Act addresses corporate price discrimination. This prevents compa-
nies from engaging in predatory lending that might lessen competition or create a monopoly").
109. Id. (stating that "the Clayton Act also prevents companies from selling products with the condi-
tion that the buyer can only use their product").
I10. Id. (stating that "the act also deals with the organization of labor unions stating that "the labor of
a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." Corporations are forbidden from prevent-
ing the organization of labor unions. It also keeps labor strikes from being included in antitrust law-
suits. The result of this provision is that labor unions may organize and agree upon wages without
being accused of price fixing").
111. Id. (stating that "while most mergers allow the companies to create better quality goods at less
expensive prices, some mergers limit competition and make price fixing easier. This part ofthe act was
designed to prevent mergers from creating monopolies").
112. Id.
113. The Clayton Act § 15.
114. Id. (stating that any person injured "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
No. 2] 437
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conduct that may go undetected and be difficult to prove." 5 The provisions al-
lowing private suits and granting treble damages, taken together, express a federal
policy that individuals should be allowed to pursue relief for antitrust acts and that
violators should be settled with triple the damages they cause in order to ensure
violators are not able to enjoy the "fruits of their illegality."ll 6 Several of the
federal policies within the various federal antitrust statutes are now threatened by
further extension of the FAA. This issue is referred to as the Effective Vindica-
tion Doctrine and was addressed by the Second Circuit in American Express.
D. Effective Vindication Doctrine
The Effective Vindication Doctrine is a seldom-used doctrine under which
courts have "articulated a requirement that effectuating the FAA policy in favor of
arbitration does not come at the expense of important policies embodied in other
federal statutes."' 17 The Effective Vindication Doctrine was first established by
the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."
In Mitsubishi, the Japanese automobile manufacturer, Mitsubishi, brought suit
against an automobile dealer in Puerto Rico for "nonpayment of stored vehicles,
contractual storage penalties, damage to manufacturer's warranties and good will,
expiration of distributorship, and other breaches of sales procedure agreement."' '1
The dealership counterclaimed for violations of the Sherman Act as well as vari-
ous other Puerto Rican antitrust and unfair competition statutes.120
In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court found that parties could agree to arbitrate
their statutory claims because they had submitted their claim for "resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' 2' However, the Supreme Court created the
Effective Vindication Doctrine when it stated that arbitration could proceed "so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum." 22
The Supreme Court restated the requirement of effective vindication in an-
other decision, Green Tree.123 In Green Tree, the Supreme Court held that claims
created by statutes furthering important public policy may be arbitrated "so long
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum." 24 In Green Tree the Court went so far as to state
that large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant "from effectively vindicating
her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum." 25 Additionally, there have been
115. DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., Roundtable Discussion on
Private Remedies: Passing on Defense; Indirect Purchaser Standing; Definition of Damages (2006),
http://www.flc.gov/ bc/intemational/docs/RoundtableDiscussionPrivateRemedies-UnitedStates.pdf.
116. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 (stating that "§ 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring
violators and depriving them of 'the fruits of their illegality').
117. Meriweather, supra note 6.
118. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
119. Id. at 473.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 628.
122. Id. at 637.
123. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Larketta Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
124. Id. at 90 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 93.
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several circuit court decisions applying the Effective Vindication Doctrine to a
variety of claims over the years.126
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Second Circuit reviewed American Express for the third time, and for the
third time it ruled that a party may not contract away their ability to bring an anti-
trust claim in court if doing so would preclude them from ever bringing the anti-
trust claim.127 The Second Circuit made two critical findings that led to their ul-
timate decision that American Express' class action and arbitration clauses were
invalid. First, the Second Circuit found Supreme Court precedent in Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin28 that class action devices are the only economically reasonable
path when "a large group of individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong,
but the damages due to any single individual or entity are too small to justify
bringing an individual action." 29
The Second Circuit found bilateral arbitration to be an uneconomical means
of vindicating many individuals' antitrust injuries.130 In particular, the court found
that expert witness fees for an antitrust case require an expenditure in the hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars. '3 While antitrust laws allow recovery of attorney's
fees and treble damages, they do not grant recovery of expert witness fees, which
are unlikely to be recouped by the trebling of a single antitrust injury. 32 The
Court acknowledged that arbitration could be an effective vehicle to vindicate a
federal statutory right,'3 3 however due to the uniquely high costs of antitrust attor-
ney's fees and expert witness fees, in addition to the difficulty in winning an anti-
trust case, only class arbitration would be financially reasonable.
Additionally, the Court found Green Tree v. Bazzle's holding controlling to
the extent that when "a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the
ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the bur-
den of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs." 34 The Second Circuit
found no language in Concepcion, Stolt-Nielsen or any other case that suggests
this prior precedent had been overturned.'3 5 The Second Circuit found the mer-
chants in American Express had adequately showed individual arbitration would
be prohibitively expensive, and that American Express had put forth no serious
challenge to these findings.' 36
In particular, the Second Circuit focused on affidavits submitted by economist
Dr. Gary French that expert assistance in individual plaintiff antitrust cases range
126. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 605 (3d Cir. 2002); Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,
446 F.3d 25, 59 (1st Cir. 2006), Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259-
1260 (11th Cir. 2003), Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. In reAm. Express Merchants'Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
128. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
129. In re Am. Express Merchants'Litig., 667 F.3d at 214.
130. Id. at 219.
131. Id. at 218.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 214.
134. In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 667 F.3d at 216.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 218.
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from "about [$300,000] to more than [$2,000,000]" and after reviewing this com-
plaint, in his opinion, the fees would "fall in the middle of that range."l 37 Dr.
French stated in his affidavit that in his opinion as a professional economist, "it
would not be worthwhile for an individual plaintiff . .. to pursue individual arbi-
tration or litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic
study and services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might
exceed [$1,000,000]."'38 The Second Circuit found Dr. French's affidavits to
demonstrate that the "only economically feasible means for plaintiffs enforcing
their statutory rights is via a class action."' 3 9
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that it is not financially feasible for the
merchants to seek to vindicate their federal statutory antitrust rights in individual
actions due to the low amount of their claims.140 Since plaintiffs cannot pursue
these claims in class arbitration, they can only pursue them in a class action or not
at all.141 If merchants are not allowed to proceed in a class action, they will have
been effectively deprived of their rights under the Clayton Act.142 Therefore,
American Express will have effectively immunized itself against all antitrust lia-
bility by including in its contracts an arbitration clause that does not permit class
proceedings.143 For these reasons, Second Circuit concluded that American Ex-
press' class action and arbitration clause was unenforceable.'" The Second Circuit
remanded to the district court with instructions to deny American Express' motion
to compel arbitration. 145
The Second Circuit found that the circumstances required a denial of the mo-
tion to compel arbitration because it took Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen together
to mean that "parties cannot be forced to arbitrate disputes in a class-action arbi-
tration unless the parties agree to class action arbitration," 46 and the parties in
American Express had not consented to class arbitration. Without consent to class
arbitration, the Second Circuit found the only method of enforcing the merchant's
federal statutory right was via class action. American Express filed a writ of cer-
tiorari, which was granted by the United States Supreme Court on November 9,
2012.
V. COMMENT
American Express presents the Supreme Court with two important issues it
must resolve: first, whether a federal statute can override a conflicting federal
statute of equal strength, and second, if a consumer can contractually waive his
right vindicate an antitrust injury. This comment will look at the practical effect
on these two issues, should the Supreme Court rule in favor of American Express.
137. Id. at 217.
138. Id.
139. In re Am. Express Merchants'Litig., 667 F.3d at 217.





145. In reAm. Express Merchants' Litig., 667 F.3d at 220.
146. Id. at 214.
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A. Effective Vindication Doctrine
The Supreme Court should find that arbitration agreements compelling bilat-
eral arbitration of small antitrust disputes do not result in an effective vindication
of consumers' statutory rights. Bilateral antitrust disputes are too expensive, and
recoveries too limited,147 to think that consumers would still try to vindicate their
antitrust injuries if they were not allowed to form a plaintiff class. The most obvi-
ous issues are the complexity of antitrust litigation,148 the unrecoverable and ex-
pensive expert testimony and research expenses,149 the lack of mandatory treble
damages in arbitration, 5 0 and the limited number of attorneys who would agree to
represent a party who has suffered antitrust injury in the face of the aforemen-
tioned issues.
Antitrust is one of the most complex and vague branches of law in Ameri-
ca.' 5 ' This complexity leads to higher than average attorney fees for the few anti-
trust lawyers with the necessary experience to provide competent antitrust repre-
sentation.152 The vagueness of antitrust laws stems from the Sherman and Clayton
Act's limited textual guidance,' 5 3 despite their far reaching consequences. This
statutory vagueness requires antitrust attorneys to possess extensive knowledge
and dedicate thorough research to antitrust case law. While a dedicated pro se
consumer with a few hours of research on Google and his old receipts could form
a semblance of an argument against AT&T for false advertising, he could not
accumulate the necessary knowledge to bring an antitrust argument against a cor-
poration like American Express. However, complexity of litigation is not the most
glaring hurdle for an injured consumer in bilateral arbitration. The biggest draw-
back of using bilateral arbitration to resolve antitrust disputes is the lack of recov-
erable expenses for expert witnesses and research.154
As the merchants in American Express point out, it would cost a minimum of
$300,000 to research all of the relevant market information needed to analyze an
antitrust claim.' 5 5 Because none of the merchants have damages in the range of
$300,000,156 bringing an antitrust claim bilaterally would result in huge losses,
even if a merchant were ultimately victorious and received treble damages. While
147. The Clayton Act § 15(a) (stating plaintiff can only recover the cost of suit, including a reasona-
ble attorney's fee, in addition to treble damages).
148. In re Cotton Yam Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating "antitrust is a
complex area of the law, and antitrust trials (or arbitration proceedings) can be long and involved.").
149. In re Am. Express Merchant's Litig., 667 F.3d at 218.
150. See Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002)
(arbitrator "may award antitrust treble damages.").
151. In re Cotton, 505 F.3d. at 288.
152. State Bar of Texas: Dept. of Research & Analysis, 2009 Hourly Rate Fact Sheet (June 2010),
http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Archives&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentlD=l 1240. (A study of hourly attorney rates completed by the Texas Bar showed antitrust
attorney fees to have the highest medium hourly fee of any category at $500 per hour.).
153. Alan Greenspan, Antitrust Seminar of the National Association of Business Economists, Cleve-
land, September 25, 1961. Published by Nathaniel Branden Institute, New York, 1962 (antitrust laws
are "so vague that businessmen have no way of knowing whether specific actions will be declared
illegal until they hear the judge's verdict").
154. In re Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 218.
155. Id. at 217.
156. Id. at 218 (median damage for a plaintiff in American Express was $1,751. The highest plaintiff
damage claim was $12,850).
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it is conceivable that a large group of merchants could ban together to split up the
research cost, it is not realistic due to needing equal motivation and resources to
fund such a group endeavor without forming a class.157 The inability to recover
damages in excess of the cost of bringing a claim is further complicated by the
lack of mandatory treble damages in arbitration. 5 8
If parties are forced to bilaterally arbitrate, they lose the protection of auto-
matic treble recovery.159 While an arbitrator could still award treble damages,
there is nothing preventing an arbitrator from awarding standard damages with no
multiplier.16 0 Consumers are in some luck in that courts have ruled that a company
cannot explicitly contract around the right to treble damages.' 6 Mandatory treble
damages help compensate consumers for the high difficulty and cost in bringing
antitrust claims. A ruling that antitrust acts are bilaterally arbitrable would deny
consumers of the protections that Congress established for them, and further the
gap between the cost of arbitration and the likely recovery.
All of the above issues culminate in the final problem: few attorneys would
be willing to represent a consumer in a bilateral antitrust arbitration. It is simply
not worth an attorney's time to research and formulate an argument in order to
competently represent a client in a low dollar antitrust claim. The lack of mone-
tary incentive for a competent antitrust attorney, coupled with the extreme com-
plexity of antitrust actions, results in a fatal blow to consumers: they cannot effec-
tively argue their claim even if they do pursue vindication of their antitrust injury.
B. Conflicting Federal Statutes
The Supreme Court should not find that the FAA preempts the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. The policy of Concepcion, that a state statute or court decision can-
not overrule a federal statute or decision,162 is reasonable even if somewhat un-
popular. However, American Express presents a different issue stemming from
the FAA, potentially neutralizing the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The antitrust
acts passed by Congress are not unenforced or irrelevant statutes, but a crucial
element in the policing of large cor orations to prevent systematic abuse of con-
sumers who lack negotiation power.
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 16 the Supreme Court explained Con-
gress' motivation for enacting antitrust laws, private enforcement rights, and tre-
ble damages. The Court stated that "every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow
to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on
157. For more information on the difficulties of parties with divergent interests, see
Gray T. Culbreath, Ethical Issues Encountered in Multi-Claimant Litigation, The Federation of De-
fense & Corporate Counsel (2008), http://thefederation.org/documents/1 2.%20Ethical%201ssues.pdf.
158. Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002).
159. Id.
160. Id. (arbitrator "may award antitrust treble damages").
161. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding prohibitions against treble
damages . .. were invalid).
162. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
163. FTC Perspectives on Competition Policy and Enforcement initiatives in Electric Power, 97 WL
747857 (F.T.C.), 3 (stating that "it is gospel that the antitrust laws are important to maintaining a
competitive marketplace").
164. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262, 265-266 (1972).
[Vol. 2013442
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss2/7
Class Action's Last Hope
strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in
turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation."' 6 5 Removing the protection of class
action antitrust suits could result in extensive harm to consumers due to corpora-
tions making a conscience choice to violate antitrust statutes, and as a result,
weaken the competition in our markets.
Part of the statutory antitrust protections is that a party who successfully
brings an antitrust claim will be awarded treble damages.166 The Court in Standard
Oil remarked that Congress could have chosen one of any number of possible
penalties for violators of antitrust laws, however they settled on treble damages as
a way to incentivize individuals to bring private suits.' 67 Another importance of
treble damages is it represents Congress' estimation that only one out of three
antitrust violators are caught, brought to court, and successfully sued.'68 This re-
duces the incentives for corporations to violate antitrust statutes, because the dam-
ages may outweigh the long-term benefit to the corporation.' 69 In arbitration,
there is no rule that arbitrators must award an injured party treble damages, only
that they may award treble damages.' 70 Couple this with less claims being brought
overall due to a lack of effective vindication, and we are left with an equation that
always rewards corporations for consistently violating antitrust laws over a num-
ber of years.
Without arbitration of antitrust disputes, if 33% of injured parties brought
their claims in court and received their mandatory treble damages, anticompetitive
corporations are left with a 1% gain for their anticompetitive acts.17 ' A finding for
American Express would change this balance and could be seen as a green light
for corporations to act as anticompetitive as possible. If 15% of injured parties
brought their claims in bilateral arbitration - likely a generous percentage given
the aforementioned barriers - and those plaintiffs were awarded non-mandatory
treble damages, the anticompetitive corporation would reap 55% of the proceeds
procured by their anticompetitive acts. It seems unlikely that this was Congress'
intent when it enacted the FAA in 1925. 172 The fact that Congress created the
right to bring private antitrust suits in 1914, only 11 years prior to the passage of
the FAA, makes it even less likely that Congress intended this outcome.
It is more reasonable to interpret the FAA as allowing the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts to permit consumers to vindicate anticompetitive injuries, as is clearly
stated in the Clayton Act. By doing so, the Supreme Court would allow both the
FAA, as well as our federal antitrust laws, to remain both relevant and powerful.
165. Id. at 262.
166. The Clayton Act § 15(a) (1914).
167. Standard Oil, 45 U.S. at 262.
168. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 'Treble' Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.,
115, 118 (1993) (Antitrust violations do not actually give rise to "treble" damages. When viewed
correctly, antitrust damages awards are approximately equal to, or are in fact less than, the actual
damages caused by antitrust violations).
169. Id. at 118, 142.
170. Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) (arbitra-
tor "may award antitrust treble damages").
171. Lande, supra note 168.
172. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
173. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's ruling in American Express was a victory for consumers
after a series of recent defeats. The decision makes sense when trying to decide
what is desirable to our society as a whole, as well as what was intended by Con-
gress in 1914 and 1925. However, the current Supreme Court Justices have pre-
ferred to view the FAA as a proverbial steamroller, flattening any legal barrier that
tries to slow its momentum. Indeed the Supreme Court seems to have minimal
regard for the impact their arbitration decisions will have on unwary or unknowl-
edgeable consumers. Some might say it is common sense that we should not re-
quire consumers take a $300,000 loss for expert fees in order to potentially recov-
er a $5,000 judgment. It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will view
this obstacle as a bar to pursuing a federal right to vindicate an antitrust wrong.
There should be little doubt that the Supreme Court will once again come
down on the side of big business and expand the FAA to make all arbitration
agreements per se enforceable. The possibility of a victory for the merchants in
American Express took a further hit when Justice Sotomayor recused herself from
the case.174 If the effective vindication argument is defeated, then consumers wish-
ing to circumvent their arbitration agreements will be without a defense. ' How-
ever there may soon be relief for consumers who are subject to mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements in the financial industry.
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, Congress created the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),'76 a federal regulatory agency de-
signed to protect consumers.177 The CFPB began a study of forced arbitration
provisions in April of 2012.178 If the CFPB finds mandatory preemptive arbitra-
tion agreements to be an unfair financial practice, it has the ability to declare such
provisions to be unenforceable.' 79 Without the effective vindication defense avail-
able, it would be difficult for any neutral observer to classify such a system as
anything but unfair to the American consumer.
MArHEw REDDISH
174. Italian Colors Restaurant, THE Sup. CT. OF THE U.S. BLOG, (2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/american-express-co-v-italian-colors-restaurant/.
175. The Supreme Court ruled 5-3 in favor of American Express on June 20, 2013. Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
176. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2010).
177. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 15, 2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureaul.
178. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 FR 25148-05. The end-date for the study is not yet known.
CFPB Launches Study Into Mandatory Arbitration, Bringing Discussion To Congress, Kelly Grover
LLP (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.kellergrover.com/cfpb-launches-study-into-arbitration-bringing-the-discussion-to-
congress 8478.html.
179. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2010) (authority to restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration).
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